

# The “Wave” Theory of Global Terrorism: Evaluation and Critical Assessment

Daniel Dory

David C. Rapoport, *Waves of Global Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2022.

**T**errorism studies is a fairly recent disciplinary field, having only really emerged around the 1970s in the form of the Anglo-Israeli-American terrorism studies that is still dominant today. For a variety of reasons, as we have already mentioned, the development of this discipline has been rather complicated, not least because of the polemical nature of its subject and the difficulties of accessing data. As a result, researchers engaged in this field can only draw on very rare theoretical elaborations as a basis for hypotheses and research programs. This situation explains the importance of works such as Ehud Sprinzak’s on the sequential logic of terrorism; Crelinsten’s model of the interaction between terrorism and counterterrorism; and, of course, Rapoport’s “wave” theory, which is undoubtedly the best-known and most widely discussed. Its author, David Rapoport (b. 1929), is one of the pioneers of *terrorism studies*, having published a small exploratory book on the subject as early as 1971. Subsequently, this North American political scientist based at the University of Los Angeles accumulated publications on terrorism (notably from the angle of its religious motivations) and played a major role in the development (and ideological orientations) of terrorism studies, particularly through the creation and long-standing direction of the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*. In other words, we are dealing with a leading author whose influence, abundantly relayed by a powerful “invisible college,” has left a lasting mark on the discipline, not only in its intellectual aspects, but also in its dominant orientations. An analysis of the book in which this researcher summarizes his work goes beyond the scope of the usual review. In fact, it is the state of current research in the history of terrorism that can be questioned through this text. This inevitably leads to a critical reflection on terrorism studies, insofar as they are largely influenced by the writings of David Rapoport. For these reasons, this Bibliographical Watch discusses in some detail several aspects of the “wave theory” that Rapoport presents to us in this book in a version that is most likely definitive.

## Rapoport’s “Wave” Theory: Origins and Developments

It was in the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001 that David Rapoport formulated, in two articles, a first, more or less complete version of his “wave” theory,

definitively including the fourth (religious) wave. This contribution was to have an enormous influence on the discipline of terrorism studies (and beyond), as it provided a simple and attractive model for intellectually structuring a history of terrorism that was then in full development. Moreover, continuing an approach that begun with his first publications on the subject, Rapoport provides an attractive pedagogical tool that can be illustrated with the following chart:




Fig. 1: Rapoport's schematic representation of the "waves" of terrorism.

In proposing this periodization of the history of terrorism (modern and/or global) into four waves lasting approximately forty years, Rapoport uses the notion of generation. By this, he means a similarity between the main objectives and modus operandi of the various organizations operating during the same period, and which share an "energy" that mobilizes them.

In the years that followed, Rapoport repeated the basic elements of his theory, with only marginal variations, in a series of book chapters that contributed to making it a kind of "shared knowledge" among specialized researchers. However, various aspects of "wave theory" have been the subject of debate and/or alternative proposals. In 2007, for example, Mark Sedgwick attacked the chronology proposed by Rapoport, placing greater emphasis on the influences exerted by groups (Italians, Germans, Chinese, and Afghans) who inspired imitators, than on the strictly ideological factors that motivated them. Two years later, Rasler and Thompson produced a partial validation of Rapoport's model, based on empirical data (from the ITERATE database) but at the cost of serious conceptual inaccuracies.

In 2011, a rather heterogeneous book was published, entirely devoted to discussing various aspects of Rapoport's "wave theory", with a particular focus on the religious facts associated with it, to which we'll return later. On a general level,

Marc Sageman’s contribution, based on the case of contemporary Islamism, emphasizes the contextual and social factors that produce notable evolutions within each wave. With Parker and Sitter’s article, which sees the history of “modern” terrorism as stemming from four ideologically based “strains” (socialist, nationalist, religious, and “exclusionary”), Rapoport’s schema is profoundly challenged. And this, even though motivational causality is also used here as a basis for typologies, leads to an impasse that we’ll discuss later. Finally, very recently, Radil and Castan Pinos have highlighted the absence of the territorial dimension in Rapoport’s approach and provided useful elements to remedy the situation. However, by uncritically adopting the foundations of Rapoport’s theory and the periodization associated with it, these authors do not engage in an in-depth discussion of the subject.

These few indications, which provide an insight into the background and current context of the debate surrounding Rapoport’s “wave theory,” allow us to turn now to the analysis of the book in which this elaboration undoubtedly finds its most complete formulation. Given the importance of the subject, we will briefly analyze the successive chapters of this work.

## **Definitions and Nature of Pre-global “Terrorism”**

In the introduction to a work that purports to be scientific, it is customary for the author to set out as precisely as possible the nature of the subject under discussion. This usually involves a definitional and conceptual clarification, so that the reader knows, at least at the outset, what is to be discussed next. This exercise, no doubt tedious, is nonetheless essential when it comes to terrorism, given the polysemous nature of the term and the importance of the issues associated with its definition.

However, in the introduction to his book, Rapoport does not propose a clear, operational definition of terrorism, but proceeds by successive assertions without arriving at an explicit formulation. On page 3, for example, we read: “[t]error is violence employed for a religious or political objective and is not limited by the accepted moral norms that limit violence.” This vague and undecidable idea (who “accepts,” and who decides on morality), is completed a little further on by a legal normative consideration of little relevance in this context: “[r]ebels using violence to achieve a political or religious end are terrorists when they operate unfettered by military rules governing violence” (ibid.). Let’s quickly move on to the absurdity of distinguishing between political and religious motivations here, given that it’s not the theological aspect that is important here, but considerations that come under the geopolitics of religions—an issue that Rapoport clearly ignores. In short, Rapoport’s definitional effort is limited to asserting the extra-ordinary and immoral nature of terrorist violence, which has the advantage of being able to distribute the label “terrorist” widely to a wide variety of actors, depending on the polemical needs of the moment. It’s interesting to note that this definitional

vagueness is inherent in Rapoport's approach. It can be found in his early texts, particularly in a chapter devoted mainly to defining the specificity of the terrorist act. He insists precisely on the publicity aspect of the act and on the implications of the "atrociousness" that characterizes it yet fails to provide a clear definition. This lack of conceptual precision is echoed when it comes to defining the nature of "modern" and "global" terrorism, as these terms are equivalent for this author. Indeed, in *Waves of Global Terrorism* (henceforth WGT), we read: "... it was not until the terrorism of the 1880s that revolutionary activity transcended Europe and became global" (p. 2). The criterion for this "globality" is rather sketchy, as evidenced by the remarkably trivial note: "Global terrorism involves many states in various capacities and groups that cooperate in various ways" (WGT, note 1, p. 307).

After these introductory considerations, the first chapter is devoted to terrorism "before the global form." In so doing, Rapoport introduces the idea (a false one, in my view) that terrorism has existed, if not "always," at least since antiquity. We're dealing with a reality whose nature is constant (in its extra-ordinary atrocity and immorality), but whose form changes towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century for various political and technical reasons, to which we will return later.

With this in mind, Rapoport begins by examining the case of three very heterogeneous series of religiously motivated actors, partly echoing the results of earlier publications on the place of "terrorism" in three religious traditions (Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam), and on the relationship between messianism and "terror." The first group or movement considered is that of the Jewish Sicars and Zealots of the first century AD, who committed political assassinations, mainly against Jewish dignitaries accused of complacency towards the Roman authorities of the time. In this case, as in that of the Assassins (from the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism, active between 1090 and 1275), the confusion between political assassination and terrorism is a source of serious misunderstanding. Indeed, if we set out to distinguish between these two forms of political violence, it is not the motives of the perpetrators or their *modus operandi* that should be of interest, but the identity of the victims.

This extremely important point has already been made in several publications, so there's no need to return to it here. At most, we can recall the basic distinction between personal identity (specific to a particular irreplaceable individual such as a king, important official, president, etc.), functional identity (linked to the victim's functions in a government institution, the Police, the Army, etc.), and vectorial identity (associated with the victim's ability to best convey, by means of his death and/or suffering, the message that the terrorist actor aims to communicate to various audiences). And according to this criterion, the only one that in my opinion allows us to distinguish the specificity of the terrorist act, it seems difficult to include Zealots and Assassins among the terrorists. At the very most, we can include them in a long "prehistory" that precedes the appearance of terrorism, to-

wards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, precisely at a break with the practice of political assassination, as we shall see later.

The Crusades provide Rapoport with the third case of religiously motivated “terrorism.” Here again, no serious justification for this choice is offered, other than the author’s antipathy for this episode (which sometimes also attacked Jews), and the fact that the Crusaders committed “atrocities.” One might have expected a more substantial argument.

This is followed by developments in pre-global “secular terrorism,” which Rapoport sees as the action of violent mobs. Two North American cases are dealt with here: The Sons of Liberty (1765–1776), and the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan (1867–1877). Apart from the fact that these two episodes correspond to different geopolitical situations, it’s hard to see the point of including riots and crowd movements in the genealogy of terrorism. Indeed, even when they belong to the register of political violence (which is not always the case), riots, like guerrilla warfare (and/or small wars) obey their own logic, which is precisely what differentiates them from terrorism, whose communicational component is essential. Rapoport comes to a similar conclusion at the end of his essay on the subject (WGT, pp. 49–53), without drawing any theoretical conclusions.

This question leads directly to the all-important one of the origins of terrorism. The crux of the debate can be expressed simply by highlighting two contrasting positions. One (notably by Rapoport) asserts the permanence of “terrorism” since Antiquity (with cases from the Paleolithic having not yet been reported), with successive variations, the most important of which is the appearance of modern (and/or global) terrorism towards the end of the 19th century. The other, which is based on the most solid advances in the historiography of terrorism (and which I share), asserts that the emergence of terrorism marks an important innovation in the repertoire of political violence, and is the result of the convergence of a series of factors (ideological, political, and technical) which we will briefly discuss below. From then on, the debate centered on the moment when this invention manifested itself, its conditions, its explanation, and the analysis of its effects.

For his part, Rapoport makes his contribution to this debate, from the perspective of the “globalization” of terrorism, at the end of the first chapter (WGT, pp. 57–63). He rightly mentions the ideological influence of the French Revolution (but without drawing all the lessons from it in terms of changes in the form of warfare or the new importance of public opinion), as well as the consequences of several technical innovations. The roles of the popular press, railroads and steamships are mentioned, as well as the very important development of dynamite around 1866. But these factors are only hinted at, without the in-depth analysis that would have been welcome. In particular, the paucity of technical data (beyond *modus operandi*) is to be deployed throughout the book, when it would have been necessary to analyze in detail the transformations of the terrorist act during the

different “waves” or periods. These considerations provide a timely transition to the second chapter of the book, devoted to the “first wave.”

### **The First Wave (1879–1920s): “Anarchist?”**

In this chapter, which deals with the emergence of “global” terrorism (and, in my opinion, terrorism in general), Rapoport addresses the cases of Russia, anarchism in the “West” and the expansion of nationalism in Europe and Asia.

Before commenting briefly on these different episodes, it is necessary to clarify Rapoport’s entire approach in this book. While the author bases his assertion of the specific character of “modern” terrorism on its “global” nature, this chapter (and those that follow) confines itself to presenting juxtaposed case studies that refer to as many singular geopolitical situations. This choice, which underlies a serious methodological error, results from the fact that Rapoport privileges the motivational (ideological) causes of terrorism over the analysis of terrorism itself, a fact to which we shall return. However, in order to (de)demonstrate the global nature of terrorism from a certain point onwards, we obviously need to start not from national cases, but from an analysis of the geopolitical situation at the global level. This implies a unified global chronology and a representation of the equally global distribution of acts, insofar as the available sources allow.

Once the appropriate global focus has been adopted, we find ourselves in the presence of facts that need to be discriminated according to definitional criteria that are as precise as possible, to arrive at an empirically robust periodization. But this is precisely what Rapoport fails to do satisfactorily, for on the one hand, he uses a definition of terrorism that is not very operational, and on the other, he focuses on ideological criteria that fail to capture the specificity of the terrorist act.

However, what we’re talking about here is of the utmost importance, as it involves locating the moment of invention of terrorism as a specific form of political violence. For Rapoport, this inaugural moment occurred in 1879 in Russia, with the founding of the Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will) group, one year after Vera Zaslitch’s assassination attempt on a high-ranking tsarist official. This statement is doubly problematic. Firstly, because this group, like the entire movement to which it belonged, carried out political assassinations characterized by the personal (and sometimes functional) identity of their victims, the most famous of which was Tsar Alexander II in 1881. But the difficulty in taking this crucial fact into account, and thus also in grasping the essential difference between political assassination and terrorism, stems from the fact that Russian revolutionaries proclaimed themselves to be “terrorists,” not least to distinguish themselves from common criminals. The conceptual trap set for the historian of terrorism is therefore formidable if he takes the discourse of his object to be the object of his discourse, without considering that self-designations must always be subject to rigorous criticism.

The second problematic aspect of Rapoport’s position on Russian anteriority stems from the fact that a simple chronology of political violence in the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century is not enough. For if we focus primarily on terrorist acts and actors, rather than their motivations, a third group inevitably emerges in addition to the Russians and anarchists: the Irish Fenians. This movement is relatively less studied in the field of the history of terrorism, although there are now a number of solid works highlighting its importance. As a result, this global perspective brings us face to face with three movements that used various forms of political violence, and which constitute the crucible in which the invention of terrorism took place, essentially at odds with the practice of political assassination. This pivotal moment, when a combination of technical, ideological, and political factors converged to invent terrorism, occurred between 1883 and the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is not possible to develop this point in detail here; at the very most, we can indicate that two attacks clearly mark this break in the repertoire of political violence. The first was the explosion of two bombs in the London Underground on October 30, 1883 (70 people injured), which marked a change in targets for the Fenians, who had previously attacked military, police, and government buildings. The second clear terrorist act took place in Barcelona, on November 7, 1893, at the Grand Théâtre du Liceu (20 dead). Parisian attacks followed, notably that which was perpetrated by Émile Henry at the Café Terminus on January 12, 1894 (one dead and 20 wounded), confirming the inclusion of terrorism in the repertoire of anarchist violence of the period.

Having clarified these points, we can return to Rapoport’s chapter on the “first wave.” The section on Russian revolutionaries contains useful factual information, notably on the relationship between attacks and pogroms (WGT, p. 73) and the background to the assassination of Alexander II. The treatment of the European anarchist movement, on the other hand, is extremely confusing and deficient, mostly viewed through a “Russian prism” that notably fails to consider the particularities of Italian, Spanish and French anarchism. Then, in order to illustrate the globalization of “terrorism,” the Armenian, Macedonian, Chinese and Indian movements (not anarchists, by the way) are mentioned. This is incorporated in the chapter’s conclusion, where it is pointed out that “[t]wo main themes inspired the First Wave: ‘equality’ and ‘nationalism’” (WGT, p. 107). This calls into question the very name of this wave, whose motivations are, in fact, very heterogeneous and whose ideological analysis is secondary to understanding the moment when terrorism was actually invented.

Finally, Rapoport puts forward three major reasons for the decline of this first wave: a) the inability of the organizations involved to achieve success; b) the reorientation of many anarchists towards syndicalism; c) changes in police practices (WGT, p. 103). The first reason refers to the fascinating problem of the “success” of terrorism, which has given rise to important works and which Rapoport

only skims over. The second factor, although factually valid, does not exhaust the subject, for if we take Rapoport's motivational perspective, we are forced to note the permanence of elements of anarchist ideology found, for example, in the German RAF and in today's radical ecology. Finally, the third point rightly emphasizes the need to consider terrorism within the complex of actors and relationships that structure it, and where anti-terrorist policies and practices are of the utmost importance.

### **The Second Wave: Anti-colonial (1919–1960s)**

According to Rapoport, this wave began in 1919, in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles (and the Russian Revolution) which, by promoting the principle of self-determination for peoples, gave new energy to various nationalist and/or anti-colonial movements. The third chapter of the book focuses on the main actors of this period, whom Rapoport begins by referring to as “terrorist groups” (WGT, p. 113). This largely polemical designation is obviously problematic, and from the outset imposes a biased interpretative framework. For what characterizes the scientific analysis of terrorism is not the more or less arbitrary distribution of (in this case infamous) labels, but the investigation of the spatial-temporal conditions in which actors resort to terrorism as a function of tactical and strategic choices that need to be elucidated, and with effects that also need to be evaluated. This remark is neither trivial nor exclusively semantic but concerns the prerequisites for an effective analytical approach to terrorism.

The groups that make up the “second wave,” starting with the Irish IRA whose Fenian antecedents are ignored, are virtually all those involved in the anti-colonial struggles of the time. Thus, in the course of a narrative that is more a superficial account of International Relations than a study of terrorism proper, the cases of Mandatory Palestine, the Algerian FLN, the Cypriot struggle, the insurrection in Malaya, and a few other conflicts are mentioned. In all cases, apart from some useful contextual information, the reader will search in vain for answers to the central question of why, in each time and place, insurgent actors choose to resort to terrorism rather than other forms of political violence. Or a complementary question: what place does terrorism occupy in the total repertoire of action of the group in question? Answering these questions would then have made it possible to consider the various *modus operandi* employed, as well as the (sometimes unexpected) results of these acts.

One important point distinguishes the “second wave” from the first (which, for Rapoport, is characterized—frankly—by assassinations): it is the pre-eminence of actions akin to guerrilla warfare (WGT, p. 144). Of course, rather than suggesting, as this author does, that during this period “terrorism” manifested itself mainly in the form of guerrilla warfare, this coexistence of different modalities of political violence would have merited a thorough analysis. This implied first



of all, clearly differentiating between them, which once again seems to focus on the identity of targets/victims: functional in the case of guerrilla warfare, which targets police, military, and other agents of the state; and vectorial in the case of terrorism. Armed with this basic criterion, it becomes possible to go beyond contextual commentary to analyze the various terrorist complexes that arise during this period and draw from them hypotheses and/or lessons that genuinely enrich our knowledge of the subject.

### **The Third Wave (1960s–1990s): The New Left**

According to Rapoport, two events are particularly important in explaining the emergence of the “third wave”: the Cuban revolution (1959) and the Vietnam War (which ended in 1975). But this observation, which is true for most Latin American, North American (particularly the Weathermen) and West European groups of the 1960s and 1970s (German RAF, Italian BR...), is far less relevant for other entities included in this wave/period, which were part of different regional and local geopolitical situations. Thus, for example, the Palestinian movement (the PLO and its rival organizations), the Basque ETA, the Kurdish PKK and the Irish PIRA are only included in the wave at the cost of a sort of bricolage, where ideological and chronological criteria are loosely intertwined.

In this chapter, too, the contextual presentation of the various organizations, which is often largely irrelevant (see pp. 186-195, for example), is given priority over analysis of the concrete conditions of their recourse (or not) to terrorism. And yet, over the years, there have been many episodes that have allowed us to delve deeper into the relationships and differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, provided they have been properly defined. Thus, for example, the transition from rural to urban guerrilla warfare, following the resounding failure of Che Guevara’s adventure in Bolivia, certainly merited comment, particularly in order to characterize this form of political violence which (rarely) coexists with truly terrorist acts in Uruguay, Argentina, Germany, or Italy.

As for the *modus operandi* characteristic of this wave, Rapoport rightly mentions hostage-taking in various forms (kidnapping, static hostage-taking, and aircraft hijacking), without however integrating them into a discussion of their place in each group’s total repertoire of action. Here again, there was more to be said about the evolution of these different modes of operation, as a recent study of aircraft hijackings since the 1930s has shown.

The causes of the decline of the third wave are not convincingly explained, as shown by the very superficial treatment of the case of the Peruvian Shining Path (active in various forms since 1980), which nevertheless constitutes a kind of laboratory for research into terrorism.

## **The Fourth Wave (1979–2020?): Religious**

The relationship between terrorism and religious facts is a subject that Rapoport has been working on for many decades, giving rise to a series of publications, the first of which is a pioneering exploration of the relationship between terrorism and three religious traditions (Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism). This article, which has had a major influence in shaping the analysis of “religious terrorism” within terrorism studies, sets out the author’s now constant approach to the subject, which is problematic in two respects. Firstly, by asserting the temporal continuity of the terrorist act, based on an imprecise definition, we return to the question (here poorly resolved) of the moment when the invention of terrorism takes place, as discussed above. Secondly, the immediate (in the sense of unmediated) connection between an ideological (and/or doctrinal) fact and the terrorist act. This methodological error ignores the filters that exist between these two orders of facts. Indeed, for religious (or other) ideas to motivate terrorist acts they must pass through at least three decisive filters: a) tactical and b) strategic choices; as well as an assessment (however good) of c) the geopolitical situation. Consequently, the study of religiously motivated terrorism is not primarily a theological discussion, but a reflection on the geopolitics of religions. It is not possible to develop this point here, but it is essential to mention it, as it directly concerns the limits of Rapoport’s treatment of this issue in the chapter of his book devoted to the “fourth wave,” the antecedents of which can be found in a number of important texts. Thus, after “Fear and trembling...” Rapoport offers a reflection on messianism as an ideological device that can (sometimes) motivate terrorist acts; a theme he then explores in depth in a detailed (and fascinating) study of the Zealots/Sicars who fomented the Jewish revolt in 66-70 CE. This chapter is, moreover, a further demonstration of the deep links that unite this author with the Jewish scriptural tradition, a fact rightly brought to light by Jeffrey Kaplan. This is followed by a study of Abd-al Salam Faraj’s *L’obligation absente* (1980), the inspiration behind the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which organized the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. Finally, the series of texts that precede the formulation of the “wave theory” includes an article on “weapons of mass destruction,” which have focused the attention of researchers and anti-terrorist measures in the wake of the Aum affair (1995) in Japan. Far from the prevailing alarmism, Rapoport provides a reasonable, well-argued analysis of the low risk posed by this type of attack.

Returning to the book we’re concerned with here, Rapoport (WGT, p. 187) points to three major events at the origin of the “fourth wave” in 1979. These, which become four a few pages later (WGT, pp. 216-220), are: 1) the Iranian revolution; 2) the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt; 3) the century changes to the Islamic calendar; and 4) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Significantly, Rapoport skips over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982) in just three lines, even though it is a major event in terms of its multiple local, regional, and global implications.

The body of the chapter contains, as usual, a juxtaposition of cases accompanied by contextual comments that have little or nothing to do with terrorism as such, and to which it is pointless to return. However, the inclusion of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in the religious wave comes as a surprise, no doubt because of the chronological arrangement adopted by the author, and more probably because of their recourse (in particular) to suicide bombing, which Rapoport considers to be the distinctive *modus operandi* of this wave.

The question of the end of this wave gives rise to interesting developments, insofar as following the generational sequence of around 40 years, “religious terrorism” should show signs of decline towards the 2020s. These considerations are also partly in line with the analysis Rapoport published following the attacks in Paris and Brussels (2015 and 2016), where the main explanatory factor was the differences in the estimated date of the Apocalypse between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. This raises once again the question of the relationship between persistent ideological motivations (in this case, jihadist Islamism) and recourse to terrorism, which depends on the tactical, strategic, and geopolitical filters mentioned above. However, the theoretical framework adopted by Rapoport does not allow us to see the problem in these terms; at most, he can suggest that, because it is rooted in religious communities, “religious terrorism” may last longer than expected, despite some signs (difficult to interpret) that it is running out of steam. In any case, the question of whether there will be a “fifth wave,” and what its dominant motivation will be, inevitably arises. This is the subject of the book’s concluding chapter.

## **The Fifth Wave (?-?): A Fragile Hypothesis**

To fully understand Rapoport’s forward-looking conclusion, it’s important to realize that the question of the fifth wave has already been the subject of debate among terrorism researchers. Of course, the ambiguities of wave theory make it difficult to distinguish between periodization criteria based on ideological motivations, organizational forms, or characteristic *modus operandi*. What’s more, just because an ideology loses its appeal doesn’t mean that its capacity to motivate terrorist acts is mechanically reduced, as Marxism and anarchism, for example, demonstrate. In addition, considerations of the “fifth wave,” supposed to begin in the 2020s following the generational succession of 40 years, periodically reactivate an old debate and some controversies within the discipline of terrorism studies.

The old debate concerns the “newness” of certain forms of terrorism. Launched in the second half of the 1990s (notably in the wake of the Aum affair), this theme periodically resurfaces due to the poor historical culture of many terrorism studies specialists and a certain ambient intellectual laziness. This is despite some salutary clarifications, the benefits of which are neglected.

The controversies discussed here concern the predictive scope of scientific work on terrorism. The main disagreements concern the selection of variables

whose curves are to be “extended”: are we talking only about terrorist acts, or terrorist complexes (which is more fruitful), or even encompassing geopolitical situations? It goes without saying that these uncertainties are at the heart of the process of predicting the dominant features of the “fifth wave.”

In view of the foregoing, it is interesting to note the variety of “fifth waves” that have been envisaged in recent years. Firstly, Jeffrey Kaplan proposes the emergence of rather messianic “tribal” entities with mainly local interests, along the lines of the Khmer Rouge or the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, while taking considerable liberties with Rapoport’s initial schema. For their part, Weinberg and Eubank confine themselves to noting (in 2010, i.e., four years before the emergence of the Islamic State...) a certain decline in “religious terrorism,” in line with what Rapoport’s theory tends to predict. Still on the subject of ideological motivations, the same year B. Gagnon suggested eco-terrorism as the dominant motivation for a fifth regional wave. This hypothesis was later taken up and developed by da Silva, who rightly emphasizes the almost total absence of any consideration of ecoterrorism in Rapoport’s work, a fact echoed in his book, where ecoterrorism is not even listed in the index. This blindness to an undeniable reality is undoubtedly a condition for Rapoport to be able to focus his conclusion exclusively on the “far-right threat,” as we shall see later. In 2011, J. D. Simon sees the fifth wave as characterized using advanced technologies (notably the Internet) by lone actors, without dwelling too much on ideological factors. The difficulty of finding valid (and verifiable) criteria for the new wave is clearly evident in a Spanish text with strategic intent and is largely reflected in a proposal based on the emergence of (essentially Islamic) “terrorist semi-states” from 2003 onwards (U.S. invasion of Iraq).

Lacking a consistent theoretical framework, and thus enjoying considerable freedom to propose largely polemical hypotheses, Rapoport concludes his book with a reminder of his definitional criteria for “waves,” suggesting that they do not really apply to “far-right” activism (WGT, p. 273). This doesn’t prevent him from devoting most of the chapter to this movement, making the crudest of amalgams between “populist” parties, “white supremacism” (the only really bad one), “hate” crimes (those committed by whites) and racism (still the work of whites). In short, developments that combine the clichés of the left-wing press with data from Soros-funded institutions. The problem is not that Rapoport expresses a detestation that can easily be explained on ethno-political grounds, but that he passes it off as scientific proposals, at the cost of conceptual shifts that allow ideas to be criminalized under the guise of research into terrorism.

The process is essentially based on two real-life cases that resulted in over 50 deaths: the attack in Norway by Breivik (2011), and that in Christchurch (2019). In both cases, we’re dealing with solitary actors with complicated backgrounds. This is fairly well known in the case of Breivik, but less so for Brenton Tarrant, who calls himself an “ecofascist,” a compound word whose first part is generally forgotten.

Without going so far as to formally confirm the existence of a fifth wave of extreme right-wing extremism, an idea already put forward by several authors, Rapoport imposes the idea in this chapter, which looks at the situation in Europe (resistance to migratory submersion) and the United States (the Trump effect). In this sense, the text corresponds perfectly to the thematic reorientation imposed on terrorism studies in recent years, diverting research funding (on which the careers of young researchers depend) towards the “far-right” threat, to the detriment of jihadism and, above all, radical environmentalism, which is undoubtedly an otherwise problematic movement.

### **In conclusion...**

There are few cases where the analysis of a book simultaneously opens the field to the evaluation of an entire theory. This, however, is the case with Rapoport’s book, which synthesizes his entire contribution to what is supposed to be the history of terrorism, and whose periodization scheme has profoundly influenced the development of terrorism studies.

However, a detailed examination of this book leads us to disagree with Alex P. Schmid’s assessment that “[Rapoport’s] historical wave theory stands stronger than before.” There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, because of the lack of specificity of the subject matter. For what Rapoport offers us is not really a history of terrorism, but a sometimes-problematic overview of the motivational causes that led certain actors to commit terrorist acts, based on tactical and strategic choices that are never explained. At most, Rapoport sheds light on a few geopolitical situations, but no causality emerges regarding the repertoire of action (violent or otherwise) available to the various actors involved. This shift in focus, made possible by the aforementioned definitional vagueness, will have lasting effects within terrorism studies, whose theoretical and methodological foundations have yet to be consolidated.

Secondly, even if we accept “wave theory” as a working hypothesis, as its undeniable didactic interest would suggest, we come up against the problem of validation criteria and variables. Indeed, the usual databases on terrorism only include cases from 1968 (ITERATE) or 1970 (GTD) onwards. It is therefore only possible to use them for a partial analysis of the third wave and a complete analysis of the next. Further, the preliminary quantitative and geographical explorations we have carried out do not really provide empirical confirmation of the existence of “waves” in terrorism. But the question merits further research by refining the variables and developing new sets of indicators. Another potentially promising line of research is emerging from recent work on the formation of so-called terrorist groups from 1860 onwards, for which we await further information.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate once again the enormous importance of historical knowledge for theoretically consolidating studies on terrorism.

Rapoport's book, in its own way, simply reiterates this obvious point, both in terms of its contributions and the debates it should provoke if terrorism studies is, at last, to embark on the road to becoming a normal scientific field. It is, in any case, from this perspective, which goes beyond pure (and indispensable) scholarship, that the present analysis has been undertaken.

Daniel Dory est docteur en géographie HDR, spécialisé en analyse du terrorisme. Membre du Comité de Rédaction de *Sécurité Globale*.

## Notes

1. Voir notamment: Daniel Dory, "Les *Terrorism studies* à l'heure du bilan," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 22, 2020, 123-142; Daniel Dory, "Un nouveau manuel de *terrorism studies*: acquis et limites," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 32, 2022, pp. 63-73.

2. Voir, pour une approche synthétique de cette démarche: Ehud Sprinzak, "The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism," in Clark McCauley (Ed.), *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, Routledge, London-New York, 1991, pp. 50-68.

3. Voir notamment: Ronald Crelinsten, *Terrorism, Democracy, and Human Security*, Routledge, London-New York, 2021. Nous avons rendu compte de ce livre important dans: Daniel Dory, "L'antiterrorisme : approches critiques et avancées théoriques," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 29, 2022, pp. 69-81.

4. David C. Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, CBC Merchandising, Toronto, 1971.

5. À titre d'illustration de ce fait, on peut citer l'éditorial de Rapoport figurant dans le N° 3, Vol 29, 2017 (p. 393) de *Terrorism and Political Violence*, suite à l'élection de Donald Trump. Ce texte présente un *Président Donald J. Trump Symposium* qui a été réuni apparemment à la hâte en veillant à son homogénéité ethnique (Kaplan, Rosenfeld et Barkun) et idéologique (sionisme de gauche associé au Parti Démocrate). Il y exprime, sans aucune fioriture, la haine de cette frange du milieu académique envers ce Président et son électorat en des termes que l'on trouve rarement dans une publication qui se veut scientifique. Ce document est donc très utile pour comprendre la politique éditoriale de cette revue, l'une des plus importantes dans le domaine des *terrorism studies*.

6. Il s'agit de: David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History*, december 2001, pp. 419-424; David C. Rapoport,

“The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” *Anthropoetics*, Vol. 8, N° 1, Spring/Summer 2002 (en ligne).

7. Sur l’influence persistante de cette théorie dans l’historiographie du terrorisme, voir par exemple: Carola Dietze, “Introduction. Writing the History of Terrorism,” in: Carola Dietze & Claudia Verhoeven (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 1-30; et Bernhard Blumenau & Tim Wilson, “The History of Terrorism,” in: Diego Muro & Tim Wilson (Eds.), *Contemporary Terrorism Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 137-156. Ces derniers auteurs n’hésitant pas à écrire que “Rapoport’s work has become *the* dominant account of the evolution of modern terrorism” (p. 149). Voir également nos précédentes Veilles bibliographiques consacrées à l’histoire du terrorisme, et en particulier: Daniel Dory, “L’Histoire du Terrorisme: un état des connaissances et des débats,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 25, 2021, pp. 109-123; Daniel Dory, “Apports récents à l’histoire du terrorisme: enjeux et limites,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 31, 2022, pp. 47-60.

8. On retrouve, en effet, dans les premiers écrits de cet auteur consacrés au terrorisme des anticipations évidentes de la “théorie des vagues.” Notamment dans le petit livre cité en note 5; et David C. Rapoport, “The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs” [1987], in: David C. Rapoport (Ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, Frank Cass, London, 2001, pp. 32-58. Dans ce dernier texte les documents qui sont à la base de l’analyse sont distribués en trois périodes qui anticipent les trois premières “vagues” identifiées par la suite.

9. Notion expliquée notamment dans: David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism as a Global Wave Phenomenon: Overview,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2016, (en ligne).

10. Parmi les textes les plus cités on peut mentionner: David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in: Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes (Eds.), *Attacking Terrorism*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2004, pp. 46-73; David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terror,” in: Jussi M. Hanhimäki & Bernhard Blumenau (Eds.), *An International History of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2013, pp. 282-310.

11. Marc Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origin of Global Waves of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, N° 2, 2007, pp. 97-112.

12. Karen Rasler & William R. Thompson, “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, N° 1, 2009, pp. 28-41.

13. Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011.

14. Marc Sageman, "Ripples in the waves," in: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 87-92.

15. Tom Parker & Nick Sitter, "The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 28, N° 2, 2016, pp. 197-216. Dans le même volume on trouve une discussion (confuse en raison d'un flou définitionnel persistant) sur le sujet ainsi qu'une réponse de Rapoport défendant ses positions sans apporter vraiment d'éléments nouveaux.

16. Steven M. Radil & Jaume Castan Pinos, "Reexamining the Four Waves of Modern Terrorism: A Territorial Interpretation," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 45, N° 4, 2022, pp. 331-330.

17. On a présenté les différentes strates définitionnelles du terrorisme (polémique, juridique et à vocation scientifique) dans diverses publications. Notamment: Daniel Dory, "Le terrorisme comme objet géographique : un état des lieux," *Annales de Géographie*, N° 728, 2019, pp. 5-36.

18. David Rapoport, "The Politics of Atrocity," in: Yonah Alexander & Seymour Maxwell Figner, *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, The John Jay Press, New York, 1977, pp. 46-61.

19. Ce qui pose incidemment la question de savoir comment cette permanence s'accorde avec le caractère changeant des normes morales et juridiques en fonction des lieux et moments historiques...

10. David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, N° 3, 1984, pp. 658-677.

11. Notamment: David C. Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, N° 2, 1988, pp. 195-213.

12. Sur ce cas on lira avec profit: Stewart J. D'Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, "Sicarii and the Rise of Terrorism," *Terrorism*, Vol. 13, 1990, pp. 329-335.

13. Voir, par exemple: Daniel Dory & Jean-Baptiste Noé, *Le Complexe Terroriste*, VA Éditions, Versailles, 2022, p. 13.

14. Rapoport reprend ici en grande partie l'argumentation de l'article antérieur suivant: David C. Rapoport, "Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, N° 2, 2008, pp. 167-194. Article republié avec de légères modifications dans: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 137-167.



15. Sur quelques aspects importants de la généalogie de la Petite Guerre/guérilla, on lira avec profit: Jean-Marc Marill, “La guerre révolutionnaire en France au XVIIIe siècle,” *Stratégique*, N° 128, 2022, pp. 43-64.

16. Voir les Veilles bibliographiques publiées sur l’histoire du terrorisme dans cette revue.

17. L’histoire de la composante technique du terrorisme en est à ces débuts. Pour un premier aperçu de la question on peut consulter: Adam Dolnik & Rohan Gunaratna, “Dagger ans Sarin: The Evolution of Terrorist Weapons and Tactics,” in: Andrew T. H. Tan (Ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 25-39; Ann Larabee, “Terrorism and Technology,” in: Randall D. Law (Ed.), *The Routledge History of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2015, pp. 442-355; Simon Verrett, “The Science of Destruction. Terrorism and Technology in the Nineteenth Century,” in: Carola Dietze & Claudia Verhoeven (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 233-249. Ces approches générales étant à compléter par les (encore trop rares) études monographiques sur des sujets précis, comme: Paul Villatoux, “La Grenade Orsini,” *Gazette des Armes*, N° 555, septembre 2022, pp. 14-15.

18. Nous avons exploré cette approche pour les années 1970-2018 dans: Hervé Théry & Daniel Dory, “Espace-temps du terrorisme,” *Conflits*, N° 33, 2021, pp. 47-50.

19. On notera, non sans ironie, que Rapoport dans un compte rendu ravageur du livre de Walter Laqueur traduit en français sous le titre de *Terrorisme* (PUF, Paris, 1979), reproche (à juste titre) à ce dernier son imprécision conceptuelle. Voir: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 73, N° 1, 1979, pp. 293-294.

20. La littérature sur les “terroristes” russes est considérable. Ses orientations générales sont bien synthétisées dans: Anke Hilbrenner et Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, “Introduction: Modern times? Terrorism in Late Tsarist Russia,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. 58, N° 2, pp. 161-171; et Martin A. Miller, “Entangled Terrorisms in Late Imperial Russia,” in: Randall D. Law (Ed.), *The Routledge History of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2015, pp. 92-110.

21. Ce qui vaut notamment pour des termes politiques/polémiques comme “gauche morale » ou “République Populaire Démocratique de Corée”...

22. Notamment l’article fondamental de Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, N° 1, 2004, pp. 154-181. Voir aussi: Niall Whelehan, “Modern Rebels? Irish Republicans in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in: Carola Dietze & Claudia Verhoeven (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 503-518; Fearghal McGarry, “Po-

litical Violence in Ireland,” in: Richard English, *The Cambridge History of Terrorism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, pp. 254-283; lire en particulier les pp. 257-265 sur la campagne d’attentats à la bombe entre 1881 et 1885.

23. Aux facteurs habituellement mentionnés comme les idéaux démocratiques, l’invention de la dynamite, les chemins de fer, l’apparition de la presse populaire à grand tirage etc., il faut ajouter les leçons tirées des échecs des insurrections armées depuis 1848 et surtout la Commune de Paris. Sur ce point on lira le chapitre 5 (pp. 105-150) de John A. Lynn II, *Another kind of War. The Nature and History of Terrorism*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 2019. Ce livre reprend, par ailleurs l’essentiel de la démarche de Rapoport en y introduisant des rectifications marginales, sans parvenir à une meilleure conceptualisation d’ensemble. Voir notre compte rendu : Daniel Dory, “L’Histoire du Terrorisme : un état des connaissances et des débats,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 25, 2021, pp. 109-123.

24. On trouve une bonne analyse de cet attentat et de son contexte dans: Ángel Herrerín López, “1893: año clave del terrorismo en la España de la Restauración,” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, Serie V, T. 20, 2008, pp. 71-91.

25. Voir: John Merriman, *Dynamite Club. L’invention du terrorisme à Paris*, Tallandier, Paris, 2009. On trouvera aussi quelques informations intéressantes, malgré l’imprécision conceptuelle qui nuit à la démonstration, dans : Gilles Ferragu, “L’écho des bombes: l’invention du terrorisme “à l’aveugle” (1893-1895),” *Ethnologie française*, Vol. 49, N° 1, 2019, pp. 21-31.

26. Par exemple, Rapoport semble ignorer le livre de Jean Maitron, *Ravachol et les anarchistes*, [1964], Folio/Gallimard, Paris, 1992, qui est la référence de base sur l’anarchisme français. Par ailleurs, parmi l’abondante littérature sur le sujet, l’article suivant est intéressant car malgré ses déficiences conceptuelles, il se centre sur les relations souvent très lointaines entre les théoriciens de l’anarchisme et les praticiens des assassinats: Whitney Kassel, “Terrorism and the International Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, N° 3, 2009, pp. 237-252.

27. Ici encore une connaissance incomplète des sources conduit Rapoport à ne pas tirer profit de travaux qui l’auraient aidé à préciser la notion de “globalisation du terrorisme.” Voir, par exemple: Peter Heehs, “Foreign Influences on Bengali Revolutionary Terrorism 1902-1908,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, N° 3, 1994, pp. 533-556.

28. Pour une première approche voir: Daniel Dory, “L’efficacité du terrorisme en questions,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 20, 2019, pp. 157-168.

29. Sur ce dernier point voir notre étude exploratoire Daniel Dory, *Ecoterrorisme? Comprendre et évaluer la menace*, Les Cahiers de Liberté Politique, Versailles, 2023.

30. Voir notamment: Richard Bach Jensen, “The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880-1930s,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, N°1, 2009, pp. 89-109. Pour une actualisation sur le thème : Daniel Dory, “L’antiterrorisme en perspective historique: quelques éclairages récents,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 27, 2021, pp. 189-199.
31. Pour un exemple de l’utilité de cette distinction pour comprendre un procès insurrectionnel concret, voir : Hervé Théry ; Daniel Dory, “L’espace-temps du terrorisme et de l’insurrection victorieuse en Afghanistan,” *Conflits* (en ligne), 15 novembre 2021.
32. Une brève discussion de cette problématique se trouve dans: Daniel Dory, “Penser le terrorisme en 1958: Trinquier et la guerre révolutionnaire,” in: Marie-Danielle Demélas & Daniel Dory (Dirs.), *Terrorisme et Contre-insurrection*, VA Éditions, Versailles, 2021, pp. 77-96.
33. Parmi lesquels les *Tupamaros* uruguayens ont servi de modèle à bon nombre d’organisations. Pour une approche synthétique de la question, voir: Daniel Dory, “Terrorismo y Geopolítica en América Latina: Hacia un Marco de Análisis,” *Problèmes d’Amérique latine*, N° 121-122, 2022, pp. 65-86.
34. Curieusement Rapoport n’utilise pas la bonne étude de Sprinzak sur ce groupe. Voir: Ehud Sprinzak, “The psychopolitical formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen,” in: Walter Reich (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism* [1990], Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 1998, pp. 65-85.
35. Le factionnalisme au sein de la mouvance palestinienne est bien analysé dans: David Th. Schiller, “A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen,” in : David C. Rapoport, (Ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, Frank Cass, London, 2001, pp. 90-108.
36. Voir: Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, *How Terror Evolves*, Rowman & Littlefield, London-New York, 2020.
37. On a traité de ce cas dans: Daniel Dory, “Le Sentier Lumineux: un laboratoire pour l’étude du terrorisme, », *Sécurité Globale*, N° 16, 2018, pp. 93-112; Daniel Dory & Hervé Théry, “Terrorisme au Pérou: le Sentier Lumineux revisité par la géographie,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 32, 2022, pp. 75-85.
38. David C. Rapoport, “Fear and trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” *The American Political Science Reviews*, Vol. 78, N° 3, 1984, pp. 658-677.
39. Pour une première approche du sujet on peut consulter: Didier Giorgini, *Géopolitique des religions*, PUF, Paris, 2016. À compléter par l’utile mise au point de: Steven M. Radil & Colin Flint, “Geographies of Cosmic War: Comparing Sec-

ular and Religious Terrorism in Space and Time,” in: Stanley Brunn (Ed.), *The Changing World Religion Map*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2015, pp. 3459-3472.

40. David C. Rapoport, “Messianic Sanctions for Terror,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, N° 2, 1988, pp. 195-213.

41. David C. Rapoport, “Terror and the Messiah: An Ancient Experience and Some Modern Parallels,” in: David C. Rapoport & Yonah Alexander (Eds.), *The Morality of Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 13-42.

42. Jeffrey Kaplan, “David Rapoport and the study of religiously motivated terrorism,” in: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 66-83.

43. David C. Rapoport, “Sacred terror: A contemporary example from Islam,” in: Walter Reich (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism* [1990], Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 1998, pp. 103-130.

44. David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, 1999, pp. 49-66.

45. David C. Rapoport, “Why Has the Islamic State Changed its Strategy and Mounted the Paris-Brussels Attacks?” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 10, N° 2, 2016, pp. 24-32.

46. Voir notamment: Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New is the New Terrorism?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27, N° 5, 2004, 2004, pp. 439-454.

47. On lira encore avec profit l’utile contribution d’Edwin Bakker, “Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach,” *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 5, N° 4, 2012, pp. 69-84.

48. Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, N° 4, 2007, pp. 545-570; Jeffrey Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 2, N° 2, 2008, pp. 12-25.

49. Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank, “An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, N° 7, 2010, pp. 594-602.

50. Benoit Gagnon, “L’écoterrorisme: vers une cinquième vague terroriste nord-américaine?” *Sécurité et Stratégie*, Vol. 1, N° 3, 2010, pp. 15-25.

51. João Raphael da Silva, “The Eco-Terrorist Wave,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, Vol. 12, N° 3, 2020, pp. 203-216.

52. Voir: Hervé Théry & Daniel Dory, “Pour une approche préliminaire de l’éco-

terrorisme,” *Liberté Politique*, N° 95, 2023, pp. 99-109; Daniel Dory, Écoterrorisme? Comprendre et évaluer la menace, *Les Cahiers de Liberté Politique*, N° 1, Versailles, 2023.

53. Jeffrey D. Simon, “Technological and lone operator terrorism. Prospects for a Fifth Wave of global terrorism,” in: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 44-65.

54. Emilio Sánchez de Rojas Díaz, “Are we facing the fifth international terrorist wave?” Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, *Analytical Document*, 02/2016.

55. Or Honig & Ido Yahel, “A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 31, N° 6, 2019, pp. 1210-1228.

56. Lire à son propos: Raffaello Pantucci, “What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 5, N° 5/6, 2011, pp. 27-42 ; Laurent Obertone, *Utøya*, Ring, Paris, 2016.

57. Notamment: Vincent A. Augier, “Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave? », *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 14, N° 3, 2020, pp. 87-97; Amber Hart, “Right-Wing Waves: Applying the Four Waves Theory to Transnational and Transhistorical Right-Wing Trends,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 35, N° 1, 2023, pp. 1-16.

58. Parmi les textes symptomatiques, voir: Daniel Koehler, “Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe. Current Developments and Issues for the Future,” *Prism*, Vol. 6, N° 2, 2016, pp. 85-104; Yasmine Ahmed & Orla Lynch, “Terrorism Studies and the Far Right – The State of Play,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2021, (preprint).

59. Compte rendu du livre de Rapoport dans: *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 16, N° 5, 2022, pp. 106-107.

60. Voir: Neil G. Bowie & Alex P. Schmid, “Databases on Terrorism,” in Alex P. Schmid (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, Routledge, London-New York, 2013, pp. 294-340.

61. Hervé Théry & Daniel Dory, “Espace-temps du terrorisme,” *Conflits*, N° 33, 2021, pp. 47-50.

62. Sur ce point les articles suivants sont importants: Joshua Tschantret, “The old terrorism: A dataset, 1860-1969,” *International Interactions*, Vol. 45, N° 5, 2019, pp. 933-948; Joshua Tschantret, Yufan Yang, & Hoshic Nam, “An Analysis of Terrorist Group Formation, 1860-1969,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 32, N° 6, 2021, pp. 664-680.

